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SUNY Buffalo & Military Recruiters: Funding
Unconstitutional Conditions?
INTRODUCTION

Since Reconstruction, we have perceived the federal government to
be the creator and enforcer of civil rights.' Today, however, our perceptions have changed.' Particularly in the context of homosexual rights,3
the federal government offers little solace for gay men and lesbians.4 In
1. See, e.g., U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1: "No State shall make or enforce any law which shall
abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any
person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws"; Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000a-1 (1988):
"All persons are to be free, at any establishment or place.. ." from State-required discrimination;
Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 704 (1979) (primary purpose of Title IX of the
Education Amendments of 1972 was "to avoid the use of federal resources to support discriminatory
practices"; and this purpose "is generally served by the statutory procedure for the termination of
federal financial support for institutions engaged in discriminatory practices"). But see Korematsu
v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944) (forced relocation and internment of Japanese-Americans during World War II).
2. Compar4 eg., Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160 (1976) (Seption 1981 of Civil Rights Act of
1866 applicable to private contract) with Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164 (1989)
(racial harassment following formation of a contract not actionable under Section 1981); compare
also, e.g., these criminal law cases: United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218 (1967) (constitutional right
to counsel at a pretrial lineup) with Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682 (1972) (no constitutional right to
counsel at a pre-indictment lineup); Miranda v. Illinois, 384 U.S. 436 (1966) (affording broad protections in the area of custodial interrogation) with Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222 (1971) (otherwise
trustworthy statements obtained in violation of Miranda admissible for impeachment purposes).
3. This Comment refers to "homosexuals" and "lesbians and gay men" to describe women and
men whose sexual orientation is toward persons of the same sex. Some commentators suggest that
because of its pejorative cast, its common identification with only gay men and not lesbians, and its
focus on sex and not personal identity, the term "homosexual" skews discussion of issues confronting lesbians and gay men. See, eg., Note, Permitting Prejudice to Gover= Equal Protection,
Military Deference, and the Exclusion ofLesbians and Gay Men from the Military, 17 N.Y.U. REv.
L. & Soc. CHANGE 171 (1990) [hereinafter Military Deference]. For further elaboration see Rivera,
QueerLaw: Sexual OrientationLaw in the Mid-Eighties, PartI, I0 U. DAYToN L. REv. 459, 463-64
(1985) [hereinafter Queer Law, Part 1].
4. See4 eg., Queer Law, Part I, supra note 3, at 465. For example, despite the expansive language of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, homosexuals have been generally unsuccessful in bringing "sexual orientation" under the scope of the Act. Rivera offers two reasons which are often cited by courts
as justifying their exclusion of "sexual orientation" from the group of protected classes: "(1) that
only the enumerated classes were legislatively intended to be protected, and hence, any broader
protection must be added by legislative action... (2) that the term 'sex' does not encompass sexual
orientation. . . ." See, eg., DeSantis v. Pacific Tel. & Tel. Co., 608 F.2d 327, 329 (9th Cir. 1979);
Smith v. Liberty Mutual Ins. Co., 569 F.2d 325, 326-27 (5th Cir. 1978). See also Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986) (no fundamental right to engage in homosexual sodomy); Webster v. Doe,
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light of the absence of national development, some states, including New
York, are establishing their own anti-discrimination policies with respect
to homosexuals.5 A current controversy between the State University of
New York at Buffalo School of Law and the Judge Advocate General
(JAG) Corps6 externalizes some issues which may arise when states take
such initiatives. Ultimately, the debate embodies the nature of state sovereignty and individual rights in the federal system.
Using the JAG controversy as a backdrop, this Comment explores
the constitutional implications of New York State setting forth its own
civil rights agenda, at a state university, in light of countervailing federal
interests. Part I of this Comment briefly considers state executive orders
and their effectiveness in this area. Part II focuses on preemption questions raised when state and federal entities collide. Parts III and IV examine the congressional spending power and its relationship to state and
individual rights. Part V then considers the applicability ofjudicial doctrine to the JAG dispute.
BACKGROUND

The State University of New York at Buffalo (SUNY Buffalo) serves
many masters. As a state instrumentality, the University is accountable
486 U.S. 592 (1988) (refusing to consider whether the Constitution precludes a federal agency from
discharging an employee based solely on the employee's sexual orientation); Woodward v. United
States, 871 F.2d 1068 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (upholding military regulations barring homosexuals from
service), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 1295 (1990); accord Ben-Shalom v. Stone, 881 F.2d 454 (7th Cir.
1989), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 1296 (1990).
Queer Law, Part i, supra note 3, at 473 n.84, offers the following cases to typify the Supreme
Court's avoidance of gay issues: In re Longstaff, 716 F.2d 1439 (5th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 467
U.S. 1219 (1984); Van Ooteghem v. Gray, 628 F.2d 488 (5th Cir. 1980), aff'd en banc, 654 F.2d 304
(5th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 909 (1982); Mississippi Gay Alliance v. Goudelock, 536 F.2d
1073 (5th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 982 (1977); Burton v. Cascade School Dist., 512 F.2d 850
(9th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 839 (1975); Acanfora v. Board of Educ., 491 F.2d 498 (4th Cir.
1973), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 836 (1974).
5. See infra note 12 and accompanying text. See, eg., Kentucky v. Wasson, No. 86M859, slip
op. (Fayette Dist. Ct. Oct. 31, 1986) (holding state sodomy statute violates right to privacy in Kentucky constitution); Gay Law Students Ass'n v. Pacific Tel. & Tel. Co., 24 Cal. 3d 458, 595 P.2d 592,
156 Cal. Rptr. 14 (1979) (equal protection clause of California constitution bars a state-protected
public utility from arbitrarily excluding homosexuals from employment). See also Note, The Use of
the State ConstitutionalRight to Prvacy to Defeat State Sodomy Laws, 14 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc.
CHANGE 973, 980 (1986). See generally Brennan, State Constitutionsand the Protection of Individual Rights, 90 HARV. L. REv. 489, 495 (1977) ("[Mjore and more state courts are construing state
constitutional counterparts of provisions of the Bill of Rights as guaranteeing citizens of their states
even more protection than the federal provisions, even those identically phrased.").
6. The JAG Corps is the legal branch of the armed services. The Army, Navy, Marines, Air
Force and Coast Guard each has its own recruiting program.
7. N.Y. EDUC. LAW § 201 (McKinney 1979). The State University of New York is a corpora-
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to New York.8 At the same time, SUNY Buffalo must comply with federal constitutional mandates.9 Finally, as a recipient of federal aid and
grants, the University is expected to honor any conditions attached to
these monies.10
In October 1983, the SUNY Board of Trustees passed a resolution
forbidding any University program or activity from discriminating on the
grounds of, among others, sexual orientation.1" In November of the
same year, New York State Governor Mario Cuomo signed Executive
Order No. 28, which bars any state agency or department providing services, benefits or employment from discriminating on the basis of sexual

orientation. 12
tion whose purpose "shall be to encourage and promote education, to visit and inspect its several
institutions and departments, [and] to distribute or to expend or administer for them such funds as
the state may appropriate."
8. Education is a state function. See, e-g., San Antonio Ind. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S.
1, 35 (1972) ("Education... is not among the rights afforded explicit protection under our Federal
Constitution."). For a discussion of the extensive regulatory powers of the New York Board of
Regents, see O'Neil, Private Universities and Public Law, 19 BUFFALO L. REv. 155, 180-81 (1970).
9. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. School Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 506, 511 (1969) ("It can hardly be
argued that either students or teachers shed their constitutional rights ...
at the schoolhouse
gate.... [Both] are possessed of fundamental rights which the State must respect .... ").
10. Department of Defense grants and/or contracts to SUNY Buffalo comprise approximately
8% of grants and/or contracts awarded to the school annually. Telephone interview with SUNY
Buffalo Sponsored Programs Administration (June 5, 1991). This percentage equals $3.8 million
annually. Military's Gay Recruitment Ban Ignites PotentialBattle in Albany, N.Y. Times, Sept. 21,
1991 at 26, col. 3. See also, eg., Lau v. Nichols, 414 U.S. 563, 568-69 (1974) ("Respondent school
district contractually agreed to 'comply with Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964... and all
requirements imposed by or pursuant to the Regulation' of [the Department of Health, Education,
and Welfare, and to] ... take any measures necessary to effectuate this agreement.' ").
11. S. Res. No. 83-216 (Oct. 26, 1983) provides:
It is the policy of the State University of New York and the expectation of the Board of
Trustees that no discrimination against or harassment of individuals will occur on any of
the campuses or in the programs or activities of the University. Consistent with this
policy, the Board of Trustees expects that all judgments about and actions toward students and employees be based on their qualifications, abilities and performance. Attitudes, practices, and preferences of individuals that are essentially personal in nature,
such as private expression or sexual orientation, are unrelated to performance and provide no basis for judgment. The Board of Trustees expects all State University campuses
to take appropriate action to implement this policy of fair treatment.
See also DeVito v. McMurray, 64 Misc. 2d 23, 26, 311 N.Y.S.2d 617, 620 (Sup. Ct. 1970) (it is the
function of the president of any branch of the university to carry out its by-laws and resolutions).
12. Exec. Order No. 28, N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 4, § 28 (1983) provides in part:
1) No State agency or department shall discriminate on the basis of sexual orientation
against any individual in the provision of any services or benefits by such State agency
or department.
2) All State agencies and departments shall prohibit discrimination based on sexual orientation in any matter pertaining to employment by the State including, but not limited to, hiring, job appointment, promotion, tenure, recruitment and compensation.
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Pursuant to the Board's resolution and Executive Order No. 28, the
SUNY Buffalo Law Faculty, in September 1988, voted to amend all relevant statements regarding law school policies in order to prohibit sexual
orientation as an acceptable basis for discrimination. 13 Under these new
regulations, the JAG Corps, which, in accordance with military regulations, discriminates against homosexuals,14 was barred from recruiting
Ten other states have executive orders that bar discrimination against homosexuals in public employment. N.Y. Times, Nov. 1, 1989, at A27, col. 2. Two states have comprehensive statutes barring sexual orientation discrimination. See WIS. STAT. ANN. §§ 111.31-.395 (West 1988); MASS.
GEN. LAWS ANN. ch.151B, § 4 (West 1982). Some states regulate certain forms of anti.gay discrim.
ination. See, e.g., MICH. Comp. LAWS ANN. § 333.20201(2)(a) (West 1984) (prohibiting the denial
of care in health facilities on the basis of sexual preference); CAL. CIVIL CODE § 51.7 (West 1984)
(prohibiting violence based on sexual orientation against property or persons). See also People v.
Onofre, 51 N.Y.2d 476 (1980), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 987 (1981) (holding unconstitutional a state
law that criminalized consensual sodomy). Currently, twenty-four states and the District of Columbia prohibit consensual sodomy. See ALA. CODE § 13A-6-65(a)(3) (1975); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN.
§§ 13-1411, 13-1412 (1988); D.C. CODE ANN. § 22-3502 (1981); FLA. STAT. § 800.02 (1987); GA.
CODE ANN. § 16-6-2 (1988); IDAHO CODE § 18-6605 (1987); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-3505 (1988);
KY. REv. STAT. ANN. § 510.100 (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 1990); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:89
(West 1986); MD. CODE ANN. art. 27, §§ 553-54 (1987); MIcH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 750.158,
750.338 (West 1991); MINN. STAT. § 609.293 (1987); MISS. CODE ANN. § 97-29-59 (1972); Mo.
REv. STAT. § 566.090 (1986); MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 45-2-101(20), 45-5-505 (1990); NEV. REV.
STAT. § 201.190 (1987); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-177 (1986); OKLA. STAT. tit. 21, sec. 886 (1983); R.I.
GEN. LAWS § 11-10-1 (1986); S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-15-120 (Law. Co-op. 1985); TENN. CODE ANN.
§ 39-2-612 (1982); TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. §§ 21.01, 21.06 (Vernon 1989); UTAH CODE ANN.
§ 76-5-403 (1990); VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-361 (1988). Article 125 of the Uniform Code of Military
Justice provides a similar provision. See 10 U.S.C. § 925 (1988).
13. The Law Faculty's Resolution, September 16, 1988, reads in part:
[Tihe State University of New York Faculty of Law and Jurisprudence hereby adopts a
comprehensive policy of non-discrimination in all activities. This policy includes...
employer recruitment practices in any way connected to this institution: the Law School
expressly prohibits discrimination on the basis of... sexual orientation... Tihat all
employers seeking to recruit at the Law School, or in any way utilize Law School facilities or resources to effect such recruitment, be required first to sign a statement pledging
compliance with the above policy ....
14. Dept. Def. Directive 1332.14 (1982) provides in part that:
Homosexuality is incompatible with military service. The presence in the military environment of persons who engage in homosexual conduct or who, by their statements
demonstrate a propensity to engage in homosexual conduct, seriously impairs the accomplishment of the military mission. The presence of such members adversely affects
the ability of the Military Service to maintain discipline, good order, and morale; to
foster mutual trust and confidence among servicemembers; to ensure the integrity of the
system of rank and command, to facilitate assignment and worldwide deployment of
servicemembers who frequently must live and work under close conditions affording
minimal privacy; to recruit and retain members of the Military Services; to maintain the
public acceptability of military service; and to prevent breaches of security.
32 C.F.R. Part 41, App. A, Part l(H)(1)(a) (1990). For a critique of this and related regulations, see
Rivera, Queer Law: Sexual Orientation Law in the Mid-Eighties, Part II, 11 U. DAYTON L. REV.
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employees at the law school."5
275, 293-301 (1986). See also Pruitt v. Weinberger, 659 F. Supp. 625 (C.D. Cal. 1987) (holding that
regulation does not violate the first amendment by punishing status rather than conduct).
15. Many law schools have policies regarding the JAG Corps' recruitment on their campuses.
An Air Force JAG Corps notice of August 8, 1991 lists the following law schools in terms of their
campus recruiting policies:
Assistance Code Legend
0 - Unknown level of asistance or policy not yet firm.
I - Total ban, i.e. no assistance of any sort to recruiter.
2 - Placement office will give information to student about JAG upon request only.
3 - Placement office will post [JAG Corps] information, literature, recruiting dates, and

other relevant information.
4 - Placement office will help recruiter with information, scheduling interviews, and all
other assistance short of allowing recruiter in law school.
5 - Have policy, but don't enforce against JAG.
Assistance
[Year Policy
Code
was Adopted]
Law School
1
1991
U of Alabama
1
1991
U of Albany
1
1984
American U
0
1990
U of Arizona
3
Unknown
Boston College
1
1991
U of California-Davis
1990
2
California Western
0
Unknown
Benjamin Cardozo
1
1991
Catholic U
0
1990
U of Chicago
0
1990
U of Cincinnati
2
1990
Cleveland Marshall
1
1991
U of Colorado
1
1984
Columbia
0
1990
U of Dayton
1
1991
U of Denver
1
1991
Dickinson
1
1991
'Duke U
3
1990
Emory U
4
1984
Franklin Pierce
2
1990
Georgia State U
3
1990
U of Georgia
0
1984
Golden Gate U
2
1990
Hamline U
1
1984
Harvard U
1
1990
U of Hawaii
3
1990
Hofstra U
1990
1
IT Chicago-Kent
1989
4
U of Iowa
1991
1
Lewis and Clark
4
1990
U of Miami
2
1984
U of Minnesota
2
1990
U of Missouri-Columbia
I
Unknown
New York
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But the faculty's policy was short-lived. In the Spring of 1989, then
SUNY Buffalo President Steven Sample placed the resolution in abeyance and later announced that the law faculty had exceeded its authority
by enacting the policy.16 The discrimination ban was thus lifted, and the
New York U
1984
0
U of North Dakota
1991
1
Northeastern U
1984
1
Northern Illinois U
1991
1
Northwestern U
1988
0
Nova U
1990
2
Ohio State U
1984
1
U of Oregon
1984
0
Pace U
1991
2
U of Pennsylvania
Unknown
1
Rutgers U
1991
4
Santa Clara
1991
1
St. Louis U
1990
2
St. Mary's U
1990
5
U of San Francisco
1991
1
U of Southern California
1990
1
Southern Illinois U
1991
1
Southwestern U
1991
1
Stanford U
Unknown
0
Stetson
1991
3
Syracuse U
1984
1
U of Tennessee
1991
1
Touro College
1985
0
Tulane
1990
3
U of Utah
1990
0
Vermont
1986
2
Washburn U
1990
1
Washington U
1990
3
Wayne State U
1984
2
Western New England
1990
2
U of West Virginia
1991
1
Whittier College
1990
3
Willamette U
1991
1
William Mitchell
1990
2
Yale
1984
1
The other branches of the JAG Corps claim not to have a list of law schools which bar military
recruiting on their campuses. However, as all brances of the JAG Corps are bound by the same
Department of Defense regulations, all JAG Corps branches would be barred from recruiting by the
same schools. Telephone interview with Navy JAG Corps recruiter (Sept. 19, 1991).
It should be noted that university policies barring the JAG Corps from campus recruiting change
on a regular basis.
16. See SUNY Buffalo Reporter, May 11, 1989, Vol 20, No. 29, p. 1. But cf Beta Sigma Rho,
Inc. v. Moore, 46 Misc. 2d 1030, 261 N.Y.S.2d 658 (Sup. Ct. 1965), aftd, 25 A.D.2d 719, 269
N.Y.S.2d 1012 (1966) (holding that the SUNY Board of Trustees did not act arbitrarily in requiring
Buffalo chapters to comply with existing state university-wide ban on national fraternities). The
court quoted a Trustee's report which stated that "[it would be sophistry for the State University to
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JAG Corps was, once again, free to recruit at the school.
I. ExEcuTrvE ORDERS & RED HERRINGS
The executive power of the State of New York vests the Governor
with broad authority.' 7 The Governor is responsible for managing the
operation of the divisions of the executive branch,'" fixing the moral tone
of the state government, and ensuring that public servants conform their
official conduct to those standards.' 9 Moreover, when an "[e]xecutive
[o]rder directs rather than requests State agencies or employees to conduct a designated program, the order has the full force and effect of
law.,, 20

Nevertheless, the meaning and scope of Executive Order No. 28 has
engendered debate. On one hand, SUNY Buffalo officials argue that the
executive order and SUNY Resolution 83-216,21 though binding on administrators of the State University, may not be "applied to the activities
of third persons, or be22used to deny third persons access to state facilities,
services, or benefits."

Informing the administration's position is the New York Court of
Appeals decision in Under 21 v. City of New York.2 3 That case involved
an executive order, issued by former New York City Mayor Ed Koch,
forbidding those who secure contracts with the city from refusing to hire
people solely on the basis of sexual preference.24 The primary issue addressed by Under 21 was whether the Mayor may forbid city contractors
from discriminating against homosexuals, a classification not protected
by any city legislative enactment. 25 The Court of Appeals held that the
vigorously combat discrimination in its admissions and academic policies and, at the same time,
condone those practices among extracurricular organizations recognized by it." IdL at 661.
17. See N.Y. CONsT. art. IV, §§ 1 & 3. See also Rapp v. Carey, 44 N.Y.2d 157, 375 N.E.2d 745,
404 N.Y.S.2d 565 (1978).
18. New York State Inspection, See. and Law Enforcement Employees, District Council 82 v.
Cuomo, 64 N.Y.2d 233, 239, 475 N.E.2d 90, 93, 485 N.Y.S.2d 719, 722 (1984).
19. Rapp, 44 N.Y.2d at 174, 375 N.E.2d at 755, 404 N.Y.S.2d at 575 (Cooke, J.,dissenting).
20. Clark v. Cuomo, 66 N.Y.2d 185, 193 n.1, 486 N.E.2d 794, 800 n.1, 495 N.Y.S.2d 936, 942
n.1 (1985) (Jasen, J., dissenting in part) (quoting Matter of DiBrizzi, 303 N.Y. 206, 213 (1933)).
21. See supra notes 11-12.
22. SUNY Buffalo Reporter, supra note 16, at 4.
23. 65 N.Y.2d 344, 482 N.E.2d 1, 492 N.Y.S.2d 522 (1985).
24. Id.
25. Id at 357, 482 N.E.2d at 5, 492 N.Y.S.2d at 526. Similarly, New York State has not included "sexual orientation" in any legislative enactments. See generally N.Y. Crv. RiGHTs LAw
§ 40-c (McKinney 1976 & Supp. 1990); N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 296 (McKinney 1982); N.Y. LAB. LAW
§ 220-e (McKinney 1986).
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Mayor had exceeded his authority in initiating the policy.2 6 Other courts
similarly held that executive orders which mandate specific actions for
private parties are void as encroachments on legislative prerogatives.2 7
Proponents of the JAG ban suggest, however, that Executive Order
No. 28 does not place an affirmative obligation on third parties. Rather,
supporters contend, the order directs state actors to refrain from discrimination based on sexual orientation. Thus, since SUNY Buffalo is a state
actor,2" and because the law school's Career Development Office argua-

bly constitutes an agency or department as envisioned by Executive Order No. 28,29 the Order ostensibly obligates the school to refrain from
catering to employers like JAG who discriminate on the basis of sexual
preference.
Although they offer the "greatest potential source of legal protection
26. 65 N.Y.2d at 364, 482 N.E.2d at 10, 492 N.Y.S.2d at 531.
27. See, ag., Fullilove v. Carey, 62 A.D.2d 798, 406 N.Y.S.2d 888 (1978), aff'd, 48 N.Y.2d 826,
399 N.E.2d 1203, 424 N.Y.S.2d 183 (1979) (executive order requiring building contractors to undertake programs of affirmative action to insure equal employment opportunities exceeded authority of
Governor as it impinged on legislative branch); Matter of Broidrick v. Lindsay, 39 N.Y.2d 641, 350
N.E.2d 545, 385 N.Y.S.2d 265 (1976) (regulations requiring affirmative action in form of minority
employment percentages are in excess of executive authority).
28. See, eg., McLaurin v. Oklahoma State Regents, 339 U.S. 637 (1950); Sweatt v. Painter, 339
U.S. 629 (1950); Sipuel v. Board of Regents, 332 U.S. 631 (1948); Missouri ex. rel. Gains v. Canada,
305 U.S. 337 (1938). In each of these cases, action by a state university was held subject to the
fourteenth amendment. See alsoWeise v. Syracuse University, 522 F.2d 397 (2d Cir. 1975) (employment discrimination by private university found to constitute state action under federal constitution). See generally L. TaiBE, AMERICAN CONSTrUTIONAL LAW 1688 (2d ed. 1988).
Supreme Court cases set forth the following factors as determinative of state action: extensive
regulation; receipt of public funds; type of function involved; and presence of a symbiotic relationship. See, e-g., Rendell-Baker v. Kohn, 457 U.S. 830 (1982) (personnel decisions of private school
that received state aid found not to constitute state action); Norwood v. Harrison, 413 U.S. 455, 466
(1973) (state lending textbooks to private schools with racially discriminatory policies was granting
"tangible financial aid [which had] a significant tendency to facilitate, reinforce, and support private
discrimination"). See also Sinn v. Daily Nebrasken, 829 F.2d 662 (8th Cir. 1987) (state college
newspaper's refusal to print advertisements stating homosexual orientation held not to be state action); accord Mazart v. State, 109 Misc. 2d 1092,441 N.Y.S.2d 600 (Ct. C1. 1981) (involving SUNY
Binghamton); Gay and Lesbians Students Ass'n v. Gohn, 850 F.2d 361 (8th Cir. 1988) (state action
was present in denial of funding to gay and lesbian student association by student senate at public
university where university administrator had final say as to funding decisions through his power to
hear appeals).
29. See Kaplowitz v. University of Chicago, 387 F. Supp. 42 (N.D. Ill.
1972) (placement office
of university which was the primary source through which employers hired law students was an
"employment agency" within statute prohibiting employment agencies from refusing to refer persons
for employment on the basis of, interalia, sex; but law school was not required to make a determination as to whether particular firms engaged in discrimination or to prohibit those law firms from
interviewing at the law school); United States v. City of Philadelphia, 798 F.2d 81 (3d Cir. 1986)
(stipulation that law school placement office constituted "employment agency" for purposes of antidiscrimination ordinance).
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for gay men and lesbians," 3 state and local executive orders nevertheless
remain limited in several respects. First, such orders may be rescinded
through judicial invalidation or referendum. 3 ' Second, "in contrast to a
uniform federal ban on employment discrimination based on sexual orientation, local regulations can cover only a limited number of employees
and reach only selected regions of the country."3 2 Finally, local antidiscrimination ordinances may be preempted, hence unenforceable, because they conflict with federal interests.33
To be sure, the confusion over the scope and meaning of Executive
Order No. 28 suggests "the need for a rational, structured, legislative
solution to the problem" of regulating gay discrimination in public
places.34 Perhaps Executive Order No. 28 may help to "produce a more
favorable climate for [such] legislation." 35 But assuming the existence of
a clear executive command and/or a state legislative act prohibiting
SUNY officials from catering to employers who discriminate on the basis
of sexual orientation raises the question: is a state civil rights law enforceable against a federal entity, particularly the military?
II.

THE GUISE OF PREEMPTION

The supremacy clause3 6 invalidates all state laws that conflict with
30. Note, Developments in the Law: Sexual Orientationand the Law, 102 HARv. L. REV. 1509,
1583 (1989) [hereinafter Sexual Orientationand the Law] (footnotes omitted).
31. Id See also Note, The ConstitutionalStatus of Sexual Orientation:Homosexuality as a Suspect Classification, 98 HARV. L. REv. 1285, 1297 (1985) [hereinafter Note, Status] ("Judicial
designation of homosexuality as a suspect classification [for the purpose of equal protection analysis],
even though it could not automatically eradicate all forms of discrimination against gays could provide a comprehensive doctrinal framework for addressing the problem of gay inequality."); L.
TRIBE, supra note 28, at 1616 (arguing that homosexuals "seem to satisfy all of the Court's implicit
criteria for suspectness"); J.ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISRusT 148-53 (1980) (arguing that suspect
classification is warranted for politically powerless). But see The Future of Gay America, NEwsWEEK, Mar. 12, 1990, at 22 (the Human Rights Campaign Fund, a gay lobbying group, was the
ninth largest PAC during the 1988 presidential election).
In the following cases, homosexuality was accorded neither suspect nor quasi-suspect status:
Padula v. Webster, 822 F.2d 97 (D.C. Cir. 1987), cert denied, 111 S.Ct. 384 (1990); Doe v. Casey,
796 F.2d 1508 (D.C. Cir. 1986), affd in part, rev'd in part on other grounds, 486 U.S. 592 (1988).
But see Watkins v. United States Army, 875 F.2d 699 (9th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 111 S.Ct. 384
(1990) (homosexuality deemed a suspect class for purposes of equal protection analysis). Courts
have been even less willing to support a due process analysis of homosexual rights; see, eg., Bowers
v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986) (no fundamental right to engage in homosexual sodomy).
32. Sexual Orientation and the Law, supra note 30, at 1583.
33. Id.
34. Lewis, he Role ofLaw in RegulatingDiscriminationin Placesof PublicAccommodation, 13
BUFFALO L. REV.402, 436 (1964).
35. Id.
36. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl.
2 ("This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which
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an act of Congress or an administrative regulation promulgated pursuant
to congressional authority.3 7 Federal law may preempt state law in three
ways: 1) Congress may explicitly define the extent to which it plans to
preempt state law when it enacts the federal law; 2) in the absence of a
clear congressional boundary, congressional intent may be considered;
3) if compliance with both federal and state law is impossible, or if compliance with the state law would hinder the accomplishment of the full
purposes and objectives of Congress, the state law is preempted.3"
In In re GreaterBuffalo Chapter,American Red Cross v. State Division of Human Rights,39 the Red Cross, claiming exemption as a federal
instrumentality, ° refused to be bound by race, age and sex discrimination provisions of the New York State Human Rights Law regarding
employment.4 1 The Human Rights Division contended that the Red
Cross was subject to the local law under the state police powers.4 2 The
court held that because compliance with the state law would not impermissibly interfere with the Red Cross' operations, 4 3 the Red Cross would
be bound by the relatively stringent state regulations." Implicit in the
court's decision was the contemplation by Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964 of the "enforcement of state fair employment laws as an
essential component of the Federal statutory framework. '45
shall be made in Pursuance thereof.., shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in
every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or the Laws of any State to the
Contrary notwithstanding.").
37. See L. TRIBE, supra note 28, at 479-501.
38. Kentucky West Virginia Gas Co. v. Pennsylvania Pub. Util. Comm'n, 837 F.2d 600, 605-06
(3d Cir. 1988).
39. 118 A.D.2d 288, 504 N.Y.S.2d 882 (1986).
40. Id. at 289, 504 N.Y.S.2d at 883. The Red Cross was incorporated by an act of Congress. It
is a federal instrumentality. See Act, ch. 784, 31 Stat. 277 (1900).
41. 118 A.D.2d at 289, 504 N.Y.S.2d at 883.
42. Id
43. Id
44. Id at 292, 504 N.Y.S.2d at 885.
45. Id at 291, 504 N.Y.S.2d at 885. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e-7 (1988) provides:
Nothing in this subehapter shall be deemed to exempt or relieve any person from any
liability, duty, penalty, or punishment provided by any present or future law of any State
... other than any such law which purports to require or permit the doing of any act
which would be an unlawful employment practice under this subchapter.
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000h-4 (1988) provides:
Nothing contained in any title of this Act shall be construed as indicating an intent on
the part of Congress to occupy the field in which any such title operates to the exclusion
of State laws on the same subject matter, nor shall any provision of this Act be construed
as invalidating any provision of State law unless such provision is inconsistent with any
of the purposes of this Act, or any provision thereof.
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Yet several factors militate against the notion of forcing any federal
entity, particularly the military, to respect a state anti-gay discrimination
law at a public university. For example, despite the expansive language
of the 1964 Civil Rights Act,' 6 homosexuals have been generally unsuccessful bringing "sexual orientation" under Title VII's ambit.4 7 Moreover, a court could simply hold that binding the military to local civil
rights regulations substantially interferes with military operations. 48 Finally, pursuant to the constitutional command that Congress shall raise

and support an army,4 9 there are several congressional directives that
provide financial incentives for colleges and universities to cooperate
with military recruiters.5 0
In United States v. City of Philadelphia,51 the Court of Appeals for
the Third Circuit invalidated a City Commission's order that prohibited
46. See id, See also Roper v. Department of Army, 832 F.2d 247 (2d Cir. 1987) (Title VII of

Civil Rights Act of 1964 does not apply to uniformed members of the armed services); accord Johnson v. Alexander, 572 F.2d 1219 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 986 (1978). But see Hill v. Berkman, 635 F. Supp. 1228 (E.D.N.Y. 1986) (applying Title VII to uniformed military personnel).
47. See supra note 4.
48. For reviews of the historic deference accorded by courts to military operations, see generally
Note, MilitaryDeference, supranote 3; Note, FirstAmendment Rights ofMilitaryPersonnekDenying
Rights to Those Who Defend Them, 62 N.Y.U. L. REv. 855 (1987) [hereinafter First Amendment
Rights of Military].
49. U.S. CONSr. art. I, § 8, cls. 12-14 provide that "Congress shall have the Power... To raise
and support Armies... To provide and maintain a Navy... [and] To make Rules for the Government and Regulation of the land and naval Forces."
50. See Department of Defense Authorization Act of 1973, Pub. L. No. 92-436, Title VI,
§ 606(a), 86 Stat. 734, 740 (1972) providing, in part:
No part of the funds appropriated pursuant to this or any other Act for the Department
of Defense or any of the Armed Forces may be used at any institution of higher learning
if the Secretary of Defense or his designee determines that recruiting personnel of any of
the Armed Forces of the United States are being barred by the policy of such from the
premises of the institution ....
See 118 CONG. REc. 22,436-67 (1972) (statement by Rep. Herbert) ("If institutions of higher learning want to sever their relationship with the Armed Forces, that is their prerogative. But we think
the separation should be complete. We don't want to tempt their morality with government dollars."). See also Department of Defense Authorization Act of 1971, Pub. L. No. 91-441, § 510, 84
Stat. 905 (1970) (similar provision).
Congress has passed other laws which condition federal funding to academic institutions. See,
e.g., Public Health Service Act § 771(b), amended by Health Professions Educational Assistance Act
of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-484, § 501, 90 Stat. 2290 (current version at 42 U.S.C. §§ 293-95 (1988))
(denying federal grants to medical schools and their students, if school fails to transfer qualified
American students who spent their first two years of medical training abroad); National Science
Foundation Authorization Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-96, § 7, 87 Stat. 315 (1973) (codified as
amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1862 (1988)) (denying federal financial aid to campus troublemakers). See
generally Rosenthal, ConditionalFederalSpending and the Constitution, 39 STAN. L. REv. 1103,
1149-50 (1987).
51. 798 F.2d 81 (3d Cir. 1986).
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Temple University Law School, a state-affiliated school, from allowing
the JAG Corps use of the school's facilities.52 The City had acted pursu-

ant to a municipal ordinance which declared it an unlawful employment
practice for any employment agency to discriminate on the basis of, inter
alia, sexual orientation. 53 First, the court framed the issue: "whether the
Ordinance, as applied to the Law School... 'conflicts with Congressional legislation or with any discernible Congressional policy.' "I' The
court then considered federal legislation prohibiting expenditure of defense funds to universities which bar military recruiters.5 5 Though the
Third Circuit realized that compliance with these laws is voluntary, 6 the
court viewed these acts as expressing congressional intent that military
recruiters have access to university employment facilities.5 7 In light of
these federal objectives, the Third Circuit held that the City's order had
"'the potential to frustrate' effective military recruiting" of skilled personnel in the Philadelphia area.5"
Despite the Third Circuit's assurance that City of Philadelphiawas
decided solely on the basis of congressional intent,59 the ruling's undermining effect on the city's efforts at local regulation nevertheless
"impli52. Id. at 82.
53. Two Temple University Law School students filed the original complaint with the Philadelphia Commission on Human Relations. The students claimed that the Law School Placement Of-

fice, by referring students to employment interviews conducted by JAG Corps, was in violation of
the Philadelphia Fair Practices Ordinance, Philadelphia Code §§ 9-1101 to 9-1110. Id. at 84. The
Ordinance provides, in part:
(A) It shall be an unlawful employment practice:
(2) For any... employment agency... to establish, announce or follow a policy of
denying or limiting ...the employment... opportunities, of any individual or
group because of... sexual orientation ....
(4) For any employment agency because of a person's race, color, sex, religion,
national origin, ancestry, age or handicap to:
(a) fail or refuse to classify properly or refer for employment;
(b) otherwise discriminate against any person.
(7) For any person to aid, abet, incite, compel or coerce the doing of any unfair
employment practice... or to attempt directly or indirectly to commit any act
declared by this Chapter to be an unfair employment practice.
Id at 84 n.2 (quoting Philadelphia Code § 9-1103(A)(2), (4), (7)).
54. City of Philadelphia,798 F.2d 81, 85 (3d Cir. 1986) (quoting Penn Dairies v. Milk Control
Comm'n, 318 U.S. 261, 271 (1943)).
55. 798 F.2d at 86.. For relevant parts of the legislation, see supra note 50.
56. Id at 88.
57. Id at 86.
58. Id at 88 (quoting McCarty v. McCarty, 453 U.S. 210 (1981)).
59. Id at 86-88.
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cates the very structure of federalism established by the Constitution."' °
To be sure, the Court of Appeals agreed with the District Court's conclusion that "the Commission's order constituted an attempt to... 'regulate
...
indirectly through Temple University the conduct of the United
States, insofar as it adheres to its policy of discrimination against homosexuals.' "' But the Third Circuit failed to note that the same charge
can be leveled against the United States. After all, in City of Philadelphia, the federal government, with the support of congressional legislation which threatens to terminate campus funding,62 indirectly regulated
the school's behavior and the municipality's conduct as the city tried to
implement its own anti-discrimination policy.
III.

CONDITIONAL SPENDING

Congress' ability to enact conditional legislation is derived from the
Constitution. The spending power provides that "Congress shall have
Power To lay and collect Taxes, Duties, Imposts and Excises, to pay the
Debts and provide for the common Defense and general Welfare..." 6 3
Pursuant to this authority, Congress conditions grants and thus compels
recipients to accept a myriad of federal objectives.' The Office of Management and Budget has compiled a list of fifty-nine mandates that attach to every grant.6" These stipulations include, for example,
60. Wolfson, Preemption andFederalism:"The Missing Link, 16 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 69, 88
(1988) ("[P]reemption... implicate[s] controversial issues of power because of its similarity to a
power that the Framers denied Congress: the power to veto state laws."). But see L. TRINE, supra
note 28, at 479 (Preemption decisions "may pose complex questions of statutory construction but
raise no controversial issues of power.").
61. City of Philadelphia,798 F.2d at 85.
62. See supranote 50. The Department of Defense may only withdraw funds from the specific
department of a university which bars the military. 32 C.F.R. § 216.3 (1990) ("[Ihe prohibition on
use of funds applies only to the elements in which recruiting is barred effectively."). Other federal
prohibitions may apply differently. See, eg., Grove City College v. Bell, 465 U.S. 555 (1984) (Title
IX prohibition against sex discrimination applies only to program deemed to have received federal
assistance), superseded by statute, Civil Rights Restoration Act of 1987, 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-4a
(1988).
In a state university system, the pertinent question is whether the Department of Defense can
withdraw funds from other state schools. In Board of Governors v. United States Dep't of Labor,
917 F.2d 812, 816 (4th Cir. 1990), cert denied, 111 S. Ct. 2013 (1991), the court held that, under
North Carolina law, the various campuses of the University of North Carolina system were merely
sub-agencies of a single state agency. Thus, the court held that even campuses which had not contracted with the federal government were subject to federal contract provisions. 917 F.2d at 818.
63. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1.
64. See Pennhurst School v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 17 (1981) ("[Olur cases have long recognized that Congress may fix the terms on which it shall disburse federal money to the states.").
65. Cappalli, Mandates Attached to FederalGrantv Sweet andSour Federalism, 13 URn. LAW.
143, 143-44 (1981).
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nondiscrimination rules concerning race, gender, age and handicaps; policies aimed at environmental preservation and employment; and principles regarding "freedom of information" and "right of privacy."6 6
Controversy arises because these conditions often intrude into areas
which may be reserved for local regulation. 7 Most problematic are authorizations made pursuant to the rather ambiguous "general welfare."
Spending for the "common defense," on the other hand, is less tenuous
because, with the Necessary and Proper Clause,6" Congress can more
easily enact laws in its exercise of the enumerated powers dealing with
defense. 9 But, as the JAG dispute and the City of Philadelphia7 ° decision suggest, congressional grants of this nature are suspect because such
funding is ultimately conditioned on the acceptance of discriminatory
military practices.7 1
Supreme Court decisions, though usually focusing on "general welfare" appropriations, are helpful in analyzing the issues surrounding the
JAG controversy. The opinions suggest that the judiciary would not invalidate, on state autonomy grounds, conditional appropriations made
pursuant to the common defense.
In United States v. Butler, 2 the Court struck down provisions of the
Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1933 which subsidized farmers who reduced their crop production.7 3 The Court found that, while the farmer
66. Id at 145. See, eg., Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448 (1980) (Congress may employ
racial or ethnic classifications in exercising its spending powers, if those classifications do not violate
equal protection).
67. See Note, ConstitutionalLimitationson CongressionalUse of ConditionalFundingGrantsin
Light of South Dakota v. Dole, 4 WAYNE L. REv. 1643 (1988) [hereinafter Note, Limitations]. See
also Lau v. Nichols, 414 U.S. 563 (1974) (applying nondiscrimination provisions to federally funded
school).
68. U.S. CoNsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 16. Congress shall have power "tlo make all Laws which shall
be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution the foregoing Powers, and all other Powers
vested by this Constitution."
69. See supra note 48. See also McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 426 (1819);
Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 90 (1976) (The General Welfare clause is "a grant of power, the scope
of which is quite expansive, particularly in view of the enlargement of power by the Necessary and
Proper Clause."); Nevada v. Skinner, 884 F.2d 445, 449 (9th Cir. 1989) ("[i]f Congress has the
authority under an enumerated power (other than the Spending Power) to compel the States through
direct regulation to change its practices, then it may also achieve that result through the more gentle
commands of the Spending Power ....
), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 1112 (1990).
70. United States v. City of Philadelphia, 798 F.2d 81 (3d. Cir. 1986).
71. See supra note 14. Congress did not specifically legislate the military's anti-gay regulations;
rather, the regulations were imposed by the Department of Defense, pursuant to the Department's
inherent authority. But the analysis herein applies equally whether the condition is imposed by
Congress or by the Department. See Rosenthal, supra note 50, at 1104 n.3.
72. 297 U.S. 1 (1936).
73. The Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1933, ch. 25, 48 Stat. 31 (1933).
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may refuse to comply with the Act, such refusal meant the loss of benefits. 74 This, the Court determined, "is coercion by economic pressure.
[And t]he asserted power of choice is illusory. '75 Although Butler declared that the congressional spending power is not limited to direct
grants found in the Constitution,76 the Court held that since the authority to regulate agricultural production was not reasonably conferred by
77
an enumerated power, the Act was forbidden.
Since Butler, however, the Supreme Court has not invalidated any
conditional appropriation on the basis of spending power analysis. In
Steward Machine Co. v. Davis,78 the Court examined a provision of the
Social Security Act that allowed tax credits for contributions made to the
state unemployment fund, provided the state scheme was approved by
the Social Security Board. 79 Petitioner, an Alabama corporation, contended, inter alia, that the regulation unlawfully intruded upon the reserved powers of the state8 0 To strike down the tax credit plan, the
Court required petitioner to meet a two part test: first, it must be shown
that the provision of the Act was incapable of standing alone; and second, that the regulation was a "weapon ... of coercion, destroying or
impairing the autonomy of states."'" Although the Court acknowledged
the economic incentive for the state to comply with the federal regulation
and realized that, at some point, such "pressure turns into compulsion," 2 the Court emphasized the voluntary nature of the federal plan
and held that whatever the point of coercion may be, it was not met in
83
Steward.
74. 297 U.S. at 70.
75. Id at 71.
76.

Id at 66.

77.
78.
79.
80.

Id at 68.
301 U.S. 548 (1937).
Id.
Id at 578.

81.

d at 586.

82. Id at 590.
83. Id The Court continues to stress the voluntary nature of conditional grants. In South
Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 211 (1987), despite an apparent collision between a federal highway
conditional funding law and the state's broad powers to regulate alcohol under the twenty-first
amendment, the Court emphasized the voluntary nature of the federal program and upheld the
federal law; once again, the Court declined to discuss at which point" 'pressure turns into compulsion.' (quoting Steward Machine Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548, 590 (1937)). See also Nevada v.
Skinner, 884 F.2d 445, 448 (9th Cir. 1989), cerL denied, 110 S. Ct. 1112 (1990), in which the Court
of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit struggled to define "coercion":
Does the relevant inquiry turn on how high a percentage of the total programmatic
funds is lost when federal aid is cut-off? ...Or on the extent to which alternate private,
state, or federal sources... are available?... [Clan a sovereign state which is always free
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Yet, the Supreme Court has noted, since 1960 federal grants to state
and local governments have grown from seven billion to about ninety-six
hundred billion dollars, or "about one-fifth of state and local government
expenditures." 8 4 In light of the threatened loss of such federal funding,
the "choice" to which the Court often refers appears to be merely a theoretical option for a grant-dependent recipient." Moreover, "[tjhe perception that the... [local] residents have a proprietary interest in the
'8 6
funds makes rejection of the federal benefit... [even more] difficult."
In addition to Steward's coercion test, the Supreme Court has articulated other limits on the spending power,8 7 most notably, by requiring that the grant may not offend a constitutional provision. 8
Nonetheless, the Court has been unwilling to invalidate any conditional
appropriation on this basis as well.
In Oklahoma v. United States Civil Service Commission,8 9 for example, the state argued that federal highway funds could not be conditioned
on Oklahoma's compliance with a provision of the Hatch Act, which
to increase its tax revenues ever be coerced by the withholding of federal funds-or is
the state merely presented with hard political choices?
For a thorough examination of the coercion debate, see Sullivan, UnconstitutionalConditions, 102
HARV. L. REV. 1413, 1428-56 (1989).
84. Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 552-53 (1985).
85. See Note, Limitations, supra note 67, at 1649.
86. Note, The Coercion Test and ConditionalFederalGrants to the States, 40 VAND. L. REv.
1159, 1178 (1987) [hereinafter Note, Coercion].
87. In addition to the excessive coercion test, the Court has announced that the Congressional
appropriation must be for the "general welfare." Helvering v. Davis, 301 U.S. 619, 640 (1937):
The line must be drawn between one welfare and another .... Where this shall be placed
cannot be known ... in advance of the event. There is a middle ground or certainly a
penumbra in which discretion is at large. This discretion, however, is not confided to the
courts. This discretion belongs to Congress, unless the choice is clearly wrong, a display
of arbitrary power, not an exercise of judgment.
The Court also requires that Congress unambiguously state the funding condition. Pennhurst
State School v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 17 (1981) ("[Ilf Congress intends to impose a condition on
the grant of federal money, it must do so unambiguously. By insisting that Congress speak with a
clear voice, we enable the States to exercise their choice knowingly, cognizant of the consequences of
their participation.").
The Court has also declared that any condition on a grant must be "reasonably related" to the
federal interest. Massachusetts v. United States, 465 U.S. 444, 461 (1978). Dissenting in South
Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 218 (1986), Justice O'Connor argued the "reasonably related" standard (see infra notes 98-99 and accompanying text). But, as the Court noted in Dole, "[o]ur cases
have not required that we define the outer bounds of the 'germaneness' or 'relatedness' limitation on
the imposition of conditions under the spending power." 483 U.S. 203, 208 n.3 (1986).
88. See, eg., Lawrence County v. Lead-Deadwood School Dist., 469 U.S. 256, 269-70 (1985);
Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 91 (1976).
89. 330 U.S. 127 (1947).
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restricted the state's political activities.' The Court, stressing the voluntary nature of the conditional grant, rejected Oklahoma's tenth amendment argument 9 and held that state sovereignty was not offended by the
Act. 92

More recently, in South Dakota v. Dole,93 the state challenged the
Federal Drinking Age Amendment which allowed the Secretary of
Transportation to withhold a percentage of highway funds to states refusing to raise their drinking ages to twenty-one.94 South Dakota argued
that "'Congress may not use the spending power to regulate that which
it is prohibited from regulating directly under the Twenty-first Amendment.' "' But the Court rejected the state's independent constitutional
bar theory and instead found "that the language in... earlier opinions
stands for the.., proposition that the [spending] power may not be used
to induce the States to engage in activities that would themselves be unconstitutional." 96 Upholding the appropriation, the Court suggested that
"a grant of federal funds conditioned on invidiously discriminatory state
action.., would be an illegitimate exercise of... Congress' broad spending power." 97
In dissent, Justice O'Connor argued that the condition imposed by
Congress was too attenuated from highway funds to pass constitutional
muster. 98 Drawing on Butler, O'Connor emphasized the practical effect
that such conditions have on state sovereignty: "the reality, given the
vast financial resources of the Federal Government, is that the Spending
Clause gives 'power to the Congress to tear down the barriers, to invade
the states jurisdiction, and to become a parliament of the whole
people.'...
90.

Id. at 129. The applicable section of the Hatch Act provided that:
[No officer or employee of any State or local agency whose principle employment is in
connection with any activity which is financed in whole or in part by loans or grants
made by the United States or by any Federal agency shall... take any active part in
political management or in political campaigns.
91. U.S. CONST. amend. X: "The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people."

92. 330 U.S. at 143-44.
93. 483 U.S. 203 (1987).
94. Id at 205. The state stood to lose 5% of its federal highway funding. Id at 211.
95. Id at 205 (quoting Brief for Petitioner at 52-53). U.S. CONST. amend. XXI, § 2 provides:
"The transportation or importation into any State, Territory, or possession of the United States for
delivery or use therein of intoxicating liquors, in violation of the laws thereof, is hereby prohibited."
96. 483 U.S. at 210.
97. Id at 210-11.
98. Id. at 218 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
99. Id. (quoting United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 78 (1936)). See also Nevada v. Skinner, 884
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The Oklahoma and Dole decisions, together with Garcia v. San
Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority,100 suggest that a constitutional

bar to congressional spending, particularly via the tenth amendment, is
unlikely to be judicially approved.10 1 In Garcia, the Supreme Court ex-

tolled state sovereignty as being more properly preserved "by procedural
safeguards inherent in the structure of the federal system than by judi-

cially created limitations on federal power.""0 2 These protections, Garcia
argued, ensure that states are free to pursue "any activity that their citi-

zens choose for the common weal, no matter how unorthodox or unnecessary anyone else.., deems state involvement to be." 10 3 But, as the
JAG controversy demonstrates, these procedural safeguards are

thwarted by Congressional spending schemes.
F.2d 445 (9th Cir. 1989) (upholding Congress' ability to cut off 95% of Nevada's highway funds if
state failed to adopt national speed limit), cert. denied., 110 S.Ct. 1112 (1990).
100. 469 U.S. 528 (1985).
101. See generally Note, Limitations,supra note 67, at 1654-57.
102. 469 U.S. at 552. Though the commerce clause, and not the spending power, was at issue in
Garcia,the Court's sentiments are also applicable in this context. See also Sullivan, supra note 83, at
1432 n.67 ("Even during the reign of NationalLeague of Cities... when federalism-based limits on
Congress' regulatory power over state functions reached their modem zenith, federal courts routinely upheld conditions on federal aid to the states that would likely have been struck down if posed
as direct commands."). In National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976) (overruled by
Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528 (1985)), the Court held that Congressional extension of the Fair Labor Standards Act to all employees of state and their subdivisions
exceeded the scope of the commerce power. The Court made clear, however, to "express no view as
to whether different results might obtain if Congress seeks to affect integral operations of state governments by exercising authority granted it under other sections of the Constitution such as the
Spending Power." Id at 852 n.17. Moreover, during the National League era, the Supreme Court
summarily affirmed North Carolina ex rel. Morrow v. Califano, 435 U.S. 962 (1979) (district court
finding that tenth amendment did not prohibit federal health which was conditioned on the requirement that local health facilities meet federal standards). See TRIBE,supra note 28, at 322.
In a footnote, NationalLeague explicitly left unresolved the scope of Congress' authority under
its war power. 426 U.S. 854 n.18. Nevertheless, during NationalLeague's reign, the Fifth Circuit
held that the tenth amendment did not limit federal authority under the war power. Peel v. Florida
Dep't of Transp., 600 F.2d 1070, 1083 (1979) ("Where the legitimate exercise of a power delegated
to Congress outweighs the interference with the state's self-determination in providing its essential
public services, the tenth amendment is no bar to congressional action."). See also Dukakis v.
United States Dep't of Defense, 686 F. Supp. 30 (D.Mass.) (reservation of power to state authority,
expressed in the militia clause of the Constitution, does not override the legitimately exercised power
of Congress to raise and support armies), afld, 859 F.2d 1066 (1st Cir. 1988); accord Perpich v.
United States Dep't of Defense, 880 F.2d 11 (8th Cir. 1989), cert. granted, 110 S.Ct. 715 (1990).
103. 469 U.S. at 546. See also Nevada v. Skinner, 884 F.2d 445, 448 (9th Cir. 1989) ("The
purpose of the coercion test is to protect state sovereignty from federal incursions. If this sovereignty is adequately protected by the national political process, we do not see any reason for asking
the judiciary to settle questions of policy and politics that range beyond its normal expertise."), cert.
denied, 110 S.Ct. 1112 (1990).
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INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS

The Supreme Court abandons spending power analysis when "more
appears to be at stake than a federal benefit,""' t particularly when the
stipulation induces an individual into an unconstitutional condition."° '
As Rosenthal remarks, "[ilt is striking that in recent years the majority
of the Court has almost never expressed in the civil liberties area what it
has said with respect to state autonomy: If you object to the condition,
you have the simple alternative of not taking the money." 10 6
In a series of cases, the Court has examined restrictions attached to
state welfare laws and invalidated the local rules as contravening individual rights provisions of the Constitution."0 7 In Thomas v. Review
Board,105 for example, the Court struck down a state requirement that a
person be disqualified from receiving unemployment benefits if he or she
failed to accept work without good cause."°9 Petitioner was denied benefits after he refused to work in a munitions factory because of religious
objections to war.110 The Court relied upon the first amendment 1 to
104. Note, Coercion, supra note 86, at 1185.
105. Sullivan, supranote 83, at 1415, defines "[t]he doctrine of unconstitutional conditions [as]
hold[ing] that government may not grant a benefit on the condition that the beneficiary surrender a
constitutional right, even if the government may withhold the benefit altogether." The JAG controversy presents the situation where "one party's consent may threaten the rights of another." Rosentha, supra note 50, at 1154. See also Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 597 (1972):
For at least a quarter-century, this Court has made clear that even though a person has
no 'right' to a valuable governmental benefit and even though the government may deny
him the benefit for any number of reasons, there are some reasons upon which the government may not rely. It may not deny a benefit to a person on a basis that infringes his
constitutionally protected interests ....
See generally the following sources for discussions of unconstitutional conditions: Epstein, Unconstitutional Conditions, State Power,and the Limits of Consent, 102 HARv. L. REV. 4 (1988); Comment,
Another Look at Unconstitutional Conditions, 117 U. PA. L. REV. 144 (1968); Sullivan, supra note
83; Rosenthal, supra note 50.
106. Rosenthal, supra note 50, at 1163.
107. See, ag., Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963) (free exercise clause bars conditioning of
unemployment benefits on agreement to work on Sabbath). The Court held that "not only is it
apparent that appellant's declared ineligibility for benefits derives solely from the practice of her
religion, but the pressure upon her to forego that practice is unmistakable." Ia at 404. See also
Hobie v. Unemployment Appeals Comm'n, 480 U.S. 136 (1987); accord Frazee v. Illinois Dep't of
Employment, 109 S. Ct. 1514 (1989); Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970) (welfare benefits cannot be conditioned on waiver of procedural due process rights); Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513
(1958) (first amendment bars conditioning of tax exemption on showing that taxpayer had not engaged in subversive advocacy).
108. 450 U.S. 707 (1981).
109. Id.
110. Id. at 710-11.
111. U.S. CONST. amend. I: "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech ......
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emphasize the requirement's coercive nature:
Where the state conditions receipt of an important benefit upon conduct
proscribed by a religious faith, or where it denies such a benefit because of
conduct mandated by religious belief, thereby putting substantial pressure
on an adherent to modify his behavior and to violate his beliefs, a burden
upon religion exists. While the compulsion may be
1 12indirect, the infringement upon free exercise is nonetheless substantial.
The Court has applied similar reasoning in other contexts as well.

In Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 113 a case involving SUNY Buffalo, the
Court invalidated New York statutes"' and administrative regula-

tions115 that barred State University employment solely on the basis of
membership in subversive organizations. 16 The Court held that this
condition to work seeks "to bar employment [for both] association which
legitimately may be proscribed and.., association which may not be
'
proscribed consistently with first amendment rights."117
Petitioners in FCC v. League of Women Voters118 challenged a sec-

tion of the Public Broadcasting Act of 1967119 which prohibited any noncommercial educational broadcasting station receiving federal grants

from "engag[ing] in editorializing."' 120 Though the Court struck down
the provision, it did not evaluate the restriction as a condition on a federal expenditure.12 1 Rather, the Court used the same strict scrutiny analysis which it would apply to a direct regulation that abridged speech. 122
112. 450 U.S. at 717-18.
113. 385 U.S. 589 (1967).
114. N.Y. CiV. SERv. L. § 105 (McKinney 1963) (statute provided for the termination of any

teacher in a state supported educational institution who advocated subversive activities); accord N.Y.
EDuc. L. §§ 3021-22 (McKinney 1963) (reprintedin 385 U.S. at 610).
115. Rules of the Board of Regents, art. XVIII (1949) (reprintedin 385 U.S. at 614-17) provided
for, inter alia, mandatory faculty "loyalty oaths."
116. 385 U.S. at 609.
117. Id. at 589. See also United States v. Robel, 389 U.S. 258 (1967) (mere membership in the
Communist Party could not bar a person from employment in private defense establishments important to national security). But see Law Students Research Council, Inc. v. Wadmond, 401 U.S. 154
(1971) (bar examiners may ask about Communist affiliations as a preliminary to further inquiry and
may exclude an applicant for refusal to answer); accord Konigsberg v. State Bar of California, 366
U.S. 36 (1961).
118. 468 U.S. 364 (1984).
119. Public Broadcasting Act of 1967, Pub. L. No. 90-129, 81 Stat. 365, 47 U.S.C § 399 (1967)
(forbidding any "noncommercial educational broadcasting station which receives a grant from the
Corporation" to "engage in editorializing"). See 468 U.S. at 366.
120. 468 U.S. at 366. The federal funds at stake amounted to about 25% of public broadcasting's budget. Id.
121. Id. at 399-401.
122. Id. at 384, 396-99.
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In Clarke v. United States, 123 District of Columbia Council members
brought suit challenging a congressional act that conditioned the Districet's federal appropriations on the Council's passage of certain federal
legislation. The Act specified that any District of Columbia school affiliated with a religious organization need not provide equal access to homosexuals." 4 While Clarke invited examination of the effect of conditional
spending on District autonomy, 125 the Circuit Court of Appeals instead
focused on the condition as a regulation of council members' speech.' 26
And under the auspices of the first amendment, the court found that the
federal act "coerces... Council members' votes on a particular piece of
legislation, and, because none of the interests asserted... justify the
abridgement of... members' free speech rights," the court held the fed27
eral act unconstitutional.1
Although Clarke and its relatives carry the colors of first amend-

ment rights, the judiciary will, of course, not strike down regulations
whenever individual rights are conditionally threatened. 2 ' The most
123. 886 F.2d 404 (D.C. Cir. 1989), vacated as moot, 915 F.2d 699 (D.C. Cir. 1990). The case
remains noteworthy for its evaluation of a conditional spending requirement as implicating plaintiffs'
first amendment rights.
124. Id. The 1989 District of Columbia Appropriations Act, Pub. L. No. 100-462, 102 Stat.
2269 § 1-2520 (1988) provides, in part:
Notwithstanding any other provision of the laws of the District of Columbia, it shall not
be an unlawful discriminatory practice in the District of Columbia for any educational
institution that is affiliated with a religious organization or closely associated with the
tenants of a religious organization to deny, restrict, abridge, or condition (A) the use of
any fund, service, facility, or benefit; or (B) the granting of any endorsement, approval,
or recognition, to any person or persons that are engaged in, promoting, encouraging, or
condoning any homosexual act, lifestyle, orientation, or belief.
This piece of legislation was enacted in response to the D.C. Circuit's decision in Gay Rights Coalition v. Georgetown Univ., 536 A.2d I (D.C. 1987) (en banc) (Georgetown required to provide
homosexuals with equal access to University facilities and services).
125. See, eg, District of Columbia Self-Government and Governmental Reorganization Act
("Home Rule Act"), Pub. L. No. 93-198, 87 Stat. 774 (1973) (intended to "grant the inhabitants of
the District of Columbia powers of local self-government").
126. 886F.2dat41l.
127. Id at 406. See id at 418 (Buckley, J., concurring) ("At what point... does a federal
grant-in-aid program cross the line that separates the encouragement of state municipal action from
coercion? Are the constitutional rights of corporate directors and university trustees comparable to
those of state and municipal legislators?").
128. See Lyng v. International Union, UAW, 485 U.S. 360 (1988) (rejecting an unconstitutional
conditions challenge to amendment barring federal food stamps from otherwise eligible households
that had become needy because a household member was on strike); Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1
(1976) (per curiam) (Congress did not violate first amendment when it conditioned acceptance of
public campaign funds on an agreement by the candidate to abide by specified expenditure
limitations).
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striking example here is the Supreme Court's recent Rust v. Sullivan12 9
decision. There, per Chief Justice Rehnquist, the Court upheld government regulations that barred doctors at family planning clinics which are
funded by Title X funds from discussing abortion with patients.1 30 Petitioners argued that the regulations violated the first amendment rights of
health providers by, inter alia, "condition[ing] the receipt of a benefit,...
Title X funding, on the relinquishment of a constitutional right, the right
to engage in abortion advocacy and counseling."'' Dismissing the challenge, the Court distinguished Rust from unconstitutional conditions
32
cases like FCCv. League of Women Voters:'
[H]ere the government is not denying a benefit to anyone, but is instead
simply insisting that public funds be spent for the purposes for which they
were authorized. The... regulations do not force the Title X grantee to
give up abortion-related speech; they merely require that the
grantee keep
133
such activities separate and distinct from Title X activities.
Petitioners also contended that since Title X requires grant recipients to contribute matching funds, the "regulations . . . penaliz[ed]
speech funded with non-Title X monies."' x31 Rejecting this argument,
the Court found that "[b]y accepting Title X funds, a recipient voluntarily consents to any restrictions placed on any matching funds...
The Court then declared: "Potential grant recipients can choose between
accepting Title X funds-subject to the Government's conditions that
they provide matching funds and forego abortion counseling and referral
in the Title X project-or declining the subsidy and financing their own
' ' 36
unsubsidized program.
129. Ill S.Ct. 1759 (1991).
130. "Title X project may not provide counseling concerning the use of abortion as a method of
family planning or provide referral for abortion as a method of family planning." 42 CFR
§ 59.8(a)(1) (1990). These regulations were promulgated pursuant to Title X of the Public Health
Service Act, Pub. L. No. 91-572, 84 Stat. 1506, (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 300 to 300a-41
(1988)), which provides federal funding for family planning clinics. Section 1008 of the Act, 42
U.S.C. § 300a-6 (1988), states that: "[n]one of the funds appropriated under this subehapter shall be
used in programs where abortion is a method of family planning."
131. 111 S.Ct at 1774.
132. Id, distinguishing 468 U.S. 364.
133. Id

134. Id at 1775 n.5.
135. Id

136. Id This is language reminiscent of that used by the Court when deciding conflicts between
state autonomy and conditional federal spending. See supra, notes 78-92 and accompanying text.

1991]
V.

913

SUNY BUFFALO AND MILITARY RECRUITERS
SPENDING POWER AND INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS IN THE
CONTROVERSY

JAG

This Comment does not dispute the objective of federal laws that
entice universities to cooperate with the military.13 7 Rather, this Comment focuses on conditions which are collateral to the purpose of raising
an army.13 8 The stipulations attached to campus recruitment laws are
suspect because they threaten the constitutional rights of some students.1 39 In particular, obtaining ajob with the JAG Corps may "exact a
specified silence"'" and, ultimately, "entail the wholesale surrender of
speech rights"14 from gay men and lesbians who seek the government
benefit of a job. 4 2 SUNY Buffalo's consent to these laws ostensibly
yields the rights of some of its students. 4 3
As the Philadelphia"4 decision demonstrates, however, the issues
raised by courts, particularly in the military context, are not necessarily
"in the form of [the] alleged unconstitutionality of the condition, but in
the guise of statutory interpretation."' 4
Nevertheless, in a series of cases involving gay student groups,
courts have approved first amendment arguments'" to support rights to
137. See supra note 50.
138. See supra note 14.
139. Cf United States v. Jefferson County Bd. of Educ., 372 F.2d 836, 882 (5th Cir. 1966)
(" 'The legality [of desegregation guidelines] is based on the general power of Congress to apply
reasonable conditions.... In general, it seems rather anomalous that the Federal Government
should aid and abet discrimination on the basis of race, color or national origin by granting money
and other kinds of financial aid.' ") (quoting Rep. Celler), aff'd per curiam, 380 F.2d 385 (5th Cir.
1967). See generally, O'Neil, God and Government at Yale" The Limits of FederalRegulation of
Higher Education, 44 U. CIN. L. REv. 524, 538-43 (1975).
140. Sullivan, supra note 83, at 1485.
141. Id
142. See, Note, FirstAmendment Rights ofMilitary,supra note 48, at 882-89 (discussing application of first amendment protection to government employees as a model for the military); Epstein,
supra note 105, at 67-73 (discussing unconstitutional conditions analysis in employment cases between government and private individuals).
143. See Rosenthal, supra note 50, at 1154.
144. See supra text accompanying notes 51-61.
145. Brewster, Does the Constitution CareAbout Coercive FederalFunding?,34 CASE W. REs.,
1, 14 (1983). Constitutional limitations apply to the military context. Compare United States v.
O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 377 (1968) (the power to raise an maintain an army and navy is "broad and
sweeping") with United States v. Macintosh, 283 U.S. 605, 622 (1931) (it is a power which "tolerates
no qualifications or limitations, unless found in the constitution"). But see supra note 102 (discussing unlikelihood of a tenth amendment restraint to congressional power to raise an army). See also
supra note 46 (discussing applicability of civil rights legislation to military).
146. Freedom of association arguments have been particularly successful. However, equal protection arguments, especially in the military context, have generally been unsuccessful. See supra
note 31.
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organize, to have school recognition, to secure access to campus facilities
and to have school funding.147 The judiciary has also ruled that statements regarding sexual orientation may constitute protected political
speech under the first amendment. 141 But these conceptions of protected
speech require gay men and lesbians to adopt either an educational goal
or take a public political stance. 4 9 In other words, "the expression is
protected, the lifestyle is not."1 50 Moreover, the peculiar judicial deference afforded to the military was not at issue in the cases discussed
above. And, in any case, while some lower courts have held that Defense
Regulations which bar homosexuals violate the first amendment because
they unreasonably chill speech,1 5 these decisions have been reversed on
152
appeal.
147. Note, Sexual Orientation and the Law, supra note 30, at 1587. See, eg., Gay & Lesbian
Students Ass'n v. Gobn, 850 F.2d 361 (8th Cir. 1988); Gay Student Serv. v. Texas A & M Univ., 737
F.2d 1317 (5th Cir. 1984) cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1001 (1985); Student Coalition for Gay Rights v.
Austin Peay State Univ., 477 F. Supp. 1267 (M.D. Tenn. 1979); Gay Lib v. University of Mo., 558
F.2d 848 (8th Cir. 1977).
148. See, eg., Fricke v. Lynch, 491 F. Supp. 381 (D.R.I. 1980) (male student bringing male date
to prom constitutes a political statement); Gay Students Org. v. Bonner, 509 F.2d 652 (1st Cir. 1974)
(gay students social activities constitute a political statement); Gay Law Students Ass'n v. Pacific
Tel. & Tel. Co., 24 Cal. 3d 458, 488, 595 P.2d 592, 610, 156 Cal. Rptr. 14, 32 (1979) ("[Tlhe struggle
of the homosexual community for equal rights, particularly in the field of employment, must be
recognized as a political activity.").
149. Note, Sexual Orientation and the Law, supra note 30, at 1589.
150. Note, Status, supra note 31, at 1294. Presumably, a homosexual wanting to work for the
JAG Corps would be forced to conceal his or her "personhood." See Gomez, The Public Expression
of Lesbian/Gay Personhoodas ProtectedSpeech, 1 L. & INEQuAJrry 121, (1983) (arguing that the
expression of lesbian/gay 'personhood,' whether public or private, is entitled to constitutional protection and that societal pressure on gay people to deny or hide their sexual orientation is tantamount to impermissible forced expression under the first amendment). Though she eventually
discounts it, Professor Sullivan elaborates on the "personhood" argument as "the view that some
attributes are so closely connected to the person that their alienation would injure personal identity."
Sullivan, supra note 83, at 1485. Sullivan states that "[s]uch a 'personhood' approach would hold
that the opportunity to exchange rights for benefits wrongly commodifies rights. Especially when
the government benefit comes in the form of money.., the condition attaches a price to the right
surrendered - a value in exchange." Id. See also Note, Equal Protection, 36 UCLA L. Rav. 915,
966 (1989) ("[This view is extremely vulnerable after Hardwick if a majority [of the Supreme Court]
can criminalize what this essentializing viewpoint describes as 'intimacies inherent in a homosexual
orientation' and 'the behavior that forms part of the very definition of homosexuality,' what constitutional duty can that majority owe to restrain its moral indignation when confronted not with the act
but with the personhood that produces it?") (footnotes omitted).
151. See, eg., supra note 14.
152. See Ben-Shalom v. Marsh, 703 F. Supp. 1372, 1377 (E.D. Wis. 1989) (holding military
regulation "facially violative of the First Amendment because it unreasonably chills the right to
freedom of speech of individuals"), rev'd, 881 F.2d 454 (7th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 1296
(1990); Matthews v. Marsh, No. 82-0216P, slip op. at 18, 21 (D.Me. 1984) (holding petitioners'
statements about her sexual orientation and her status as a homosexual both fall under the ambit of
first amendment protections, and that the Army's regulations were an unconstitutional infringement
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A first amendment assault on campus recruitment schemes is further curtailed by the Supreme Court's decision in Grove City College v.
Bell.'5 3 Although the college received no federal aid, many of its students did.' 5 4 The Department of Education thus concluded that Grove
City was a recipient of federal money for purposes of attaching sex-discrimination provisions of Title IX of the Education Amendments of
1972.'"1 Though Grove City has been nullified by congressional act, the
manner in which the Court dismissed the challenge that "conditioning
federal assistance on compliance with Title IX infringes first amendment
rights of the College and its students"' 56 remains relevant. The Court
began its brief individual rights analysis by declaring that "Congress is
free to attach reasonable and unambiguous conditions to federal financial
assistance .... ",'s Then, in language reminiscent of state autonomy
opinions like Steward Machine Co. v. Davis5 ' and Oklahoma v. United
States Civil Service Commission,'5 9 the Court stressed the voluntary nature of the congressional provisions: "Grove City may terminate its participation in the BEOG [(Basic Educational Opportunity Grants)]
program and thus avoid... [its] requirements .... ."160 The Court applied the same take-it-or-leave-it sentiment to students as well: "Students
affected by the Department's action may either take their BEOG's else16
where or attend Grove City without federal financial assistance.' '
In contrast to Grove City, the JAG dispute presents a situation
on those rights), rev'd, 755 F.2d 182 (1st Cir. 1985). See also Pruitt v. Weinberger, 659 F. Supp. 625
(C.D. Cal. 1987) (holding Army regulations did not violate first amendment by punishing status
rather than conduct). Cf Goldman v. Weinberger, 475 U.S. 501 (1986) (first amendment did not
prohibit application of Air Force regulation to prevent wearing of yarmulke by an Orthodox Jew
while on duty and in uniform).
153. 465 U.S. 555 (1984).
154. Id. at 559. The students received Basic Educational Opportunity Grants, 20 U.S.C.
§ 1070(a) (1982).
155. 465 U.S. at 560. Education Amendments of 1972, § 901(a), 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a) (1988)
provides in part: "No person in the United States shall, on the basis of sex, be excluded from participation in, be denied benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any education program or
activity receiving Federal financial assistance.. .. "
156. 465 U.S. at 575. Grove City was superseded by the Civil Rights Restoration Act of 1987,
42 U.S.C. § 2000d-4a (1988). See supra note 62.
157. Id
158. 301 U.S. 548, 590 (1937) ('ITihe law has been guided by a robust common sense which
assumes the freedom of the will .... ").
159. 330 U.S. 127, 143-44 (1947) ("Oklahoma adopted the 'simple expedient' of not yielding to
what she urges is federal coercion.").
160. 465 U.S. at 575.
161. Id. Yearly tuition for fees, room and board at Grove City College in 1983 was $4,270. Id
at 576 n.1.

BUFFALO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 39

where federal funding is conditioned, not on the rejection of discriminatory practices, but on the acceptance of anti-gay regulations. Nevertheless, in light of Grove City's first amendment approach, a federal court
may likely dismiss a first amendment attack on Department of Defense
policies by simply stressing the voluntary nature of military funding to
universities and jobs to students.
CONCLUSION

Constitutional rhetoric of "states serving as laboratories" aside, the
JAG dispute demonstrates how the strings of federal spending lasso progressive state developments at the most public of all institutions, a state
university. While the controversy offers federal courts an opportunity to
issue more definitive opinions with respect to local autonomy and individual rights,1 62 given the judiciary's historic posture on state sovereignty, particularly in spending power cases and in the military context,
it is doubtful that a court would strike down Department of Defense
appropriations as violating New York state autonomy. On the other
hand, with respect to homosexuals, some lower courts are, albeit unsuccessfully, upholding first amendment challenges to military regulations
that exclude gay men and lesbians.16
The constitutionality of federal laws which condition Department of
Defense funding to universities 1 may ultimately hinge upon a court's
willingness to first recognize that the relevant military regulations infringe upon free speech and to then find that the condition imposed by
Congress and consented to by SUNY Buffalo does not survive strict judi1 65
cial scrutiny.
CHRISTOPHER J.KALIL
162. Contra L. TRIBE, supra note 28, at 366 ("Typically, the [Supreme] Court 'narrowly construes' federal statutes to avoid broad delegations, thus finding administrative action unauthorized as
a statutory matter instead of holding congressional action constitutionally unjustified."). But see
Landmark Communications, Inc. v. Virginia, 435 U.S. 829, 843-44 (1978) (At the same time,
"[d]eference to a legislative finding cannot limit judicial inquiry when First Amendment rights are at
stake.... Were it otherwise, the scope of freedom of speech ... would be subject to legislative
definition and the function of the First Amendment as a check on legislative power would be
nullified.")
163. See supra note 152.
164. See supra note 50.
165. See Sullivan, supra note 83, at 1419 ("[A]ssuming that some set of constitutionally preferred liberties has been agreed upon, and that burdens on those liberties require especially strong
justification, unconstitutional conditions doctrine performs an important function. It identifies a
characteristic technique by which government appears not to, but in fact does burden those liberties,
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EDITOR'S NOTE: Developments regarding the JAG Corps' ability to recruit on the Buffalo Law School campus were transpiring as this issue
went to press. On September 20, 1991, the New York State Division of
Human Rights, Office of Gay and Lesbian Concerns ordered SUNY Buffalo to bar all military recruiters from campus because of the armed
forces' refusal to accept homosexuals into military service. The Agency's
order arose from a complaint filed eleven months earlier by a lesbian law
student at the Buffalo campus. The student maintained that the JAG
Corps' recruitment on campus violated the 1983 executive order barring
discrimination against homosexuals in state hiring or in the use of state
resources. Later that week, the Governor's office declared the Agency's
order to be legally unenforceable, stating that the order conflicted with a
state education law that allows the military to recruit anywhere that private employers are allowed to do so. SUNY Buffalo is appealing the
Agency's order.

triggering a demand for especially strong justification by the state."); see also Note, FirstAmendment
Rights of the Military, supranote 48, at 886 (arguing that "[Clonventional first amendment law, as
applied to government employees should guide the federal courts in judging the first amendment
rights of military personnel in peacetime.").

